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At the turn of the century, in the wave of evolutionary speculation
that followed the dissemination of Darwin's ideas, several influential Western philosophers attempted to link the evolution of
human society to the progress of morals. Authors such as Herbert
Spencer (1899), L. T. Hobhouse (1906), and John Dewey and James
Tufts (1908) argued that forms of ethical thought can be ordered
along an evolutionary dimension from simple to complex. They
suggested that the human species has ascended this scale as it has
progressed from the level of social organization of the most primCAROLYN
P. EDWARDs
is assistant professor of psychology at Vassar College,
Poughkeepsie, New York.
This paper is based upon research in Kenya with adults and adolescents
from a variety of cultural traditions. The research was conducted during 19721973 at the Child Development Research Unit (John W. M. Whiting, director)
at the University of Nairobi and was supported by grants from the National
Institute of Mental Health (MH1096-18) and the Carnegie Corporation.
This paper was first presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for CrossCultural Research, April, 1975, in Chicago, Illinois. I would like to thank
Beatrice and John Whiting, who gave much help and support throughout the
research leading to this paper.
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itive hunting and gathering societies to the level of the most complex, large-scalenations. Western Europe represented the pinnacle
of both ethical development and societal evolution.
For the last several decades these arguments have generally met
with disapproval in the social sciences. Anthropologists have
repudiated what they perceive to be nineteenth-century whitesupremacist attitudes toward foreign cultures. They prefer to adhere to the doctrine of cultural relativity, according to which there
is no scientific basis for judging the value systems of different cultures in terms of ethical superiority and inferiority. A system of
norms represents the attempt by a people to solve the life and death
problems of their existence and as such it has validity for that group.
Because there exist no objective means to measure and scale the
problems faced by different cultural groups, there exist no standards
by which to judge one people's solution as ethically superior to
another's.
Until recently most developmental psychologists have held a
theory of childhood socialization which supports the anthropologists' position (reviewed by Kohlberg 1971). They have described
the processof acquiring moral rules as one of internalization of cultural values. Their theory proposes that as children grow older,
they absorb or "internalize" the values around them and hence display more and more fully the standards of adult society. Socialization is the process by which the parent generation transmits its
values to the younger generation. A corollary to the theory is that
the moral behavior of individual children cannot be compared except with reference to the value systemsof their families. From this
standpoint, the "more moral" child is simply the one who conforms
more thoroughly to parental values (for a full discussion of the internalization of moral rules, see Aronfreed 1968). This theory grows
out of the Freudian and behaviorist traditions in psychology.
An alternative and opposing perspective emerges from the
cognitive-developmental school. His research growing out of an
early work of Jean Piaget (1932), Lawrence Kohlberg has disputed
the view of moralization as internalization of cultural values and
instead presented a stage theory of moral development (1963, 1969,
1971). Kohlberg's theory represents a synthesis of ideas from philosophy and psychology. Its major theoretical forefathers are James
Mark Baldwin, L. T. Hobhouse, George Herbert Mead, Dewey and
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Tufts, and Piaget. From Baldwin (1902) came the conception of
the stages (especially the description of the first two stages) and a
theory that growth occurs through a process of continual small adjustments-"assimilations" and "accomodations"-which tend toward a state of homeostasis. From Hobhouse (1906) came the evolutionary doctrine that links societal evolution to moral progress.
Mead (1934) provided the idea that increased capacity for taking
the perspective of others ("role-taking")lies behind moral development. Dewey and Tufts (1908) proposed a three-tiered system of
"pre-customary,customary, and reflective" levels of morality, which
are directly analogous to Kohlberg's three levels-"preconventional, conventional, and principled"-to be described below. Finally,
from Piaget (1932) came a theory of justice as social reciprocity and
the method of the clinical interview. Hypothetical moral dilemmas,
the heart of Kohlberg's method, represent an elaboration of the
method of questioning which Piaget used with young children.
Kohlberg's theory is based on a system of six moral judgment
stages, which are secondarily grouped into three levels. A summary
of this system is presented in table 1. The preconventional level,
which includes stages 1 and 2, is the level at which one would expect to find most children and some adults in any society. In contrast, the conventional and principled levels contain the four stages
(stages 3 to 6) more likely to be seen in adults than in children. Although no statistical estimates exist for the frequency of the four
upper stages in any adult population, even the United States, it is
likely that stage 3 is most common, followed by stage 4, and that
stages 5 and 6 are exceedingly infrequent except among highly
educated, elite groups.
In Kohlberg's view, moral judgment develops in an invariant
order through the sequence of stages. That is, insofar as the child's
moral reasoning changes, it is transformed from a lower stage to a
higher stage-without skipping or bypassing any intermediate
stages. A stage is a network of basic organizing principles for conducting moral thinking. Its structure provides a framework for all
aspects of the person's moral reasoning. The judgments found at
each stage are more complex and differentiated than at the stage
before it; they involve what are not only logically but also intuitively more elaborate modes of decision making. Individual differences
in moral development appear in the rate at which children progress
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TABLE 1
OF THEMORALSTAGES
DEFINITION

I. Preconventional Level
At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and
bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or
the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors),
or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels.
The level is divided into the following two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences
of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or
value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being
stage 4).
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what
instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others.
Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of
fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always
interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch
my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.
II. Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group,
or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and
obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal
expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group
involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation.
Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There
is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention-"he means well" becomes
important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists
of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given
social order for it's own sake.
III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level
At this level, there is a dear effort to define moral values and principles that
have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons
holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with
these groups. This level again has two stages:
Stage 5. The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian
overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights,
and standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole
society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and
opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the
right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis
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upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of
changing law in terms of rational considerationsof social utility (rather than
fieezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order'). Outside the legal realm, free
agreementand contractis the binding element of obligation. This is the "official"
morality of the Americangovernmentand constitution.
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the

decision of consciencein accord with self-chosenethical principles appealing to
logical comprehensiveness,universality, and consistency. These principles are
abstractand ethical (the Golden Rule, the categoricalimperative); they are not
concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments.At heart, these are universal
principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of

respect for the dignity of human beings as Individualpersons.
(From Kohlberg 1971:164-165)

as well as in their terminal points of development; that is, not all
children advance equally quickly or ultimately as far as others.
Little is known about how much development may, or typically
does, occur during the adult years of life.
A signal feature of Kohlberg's theory is his assertion that the
system of stages is culturally universal (Kohlberg 1969). This claim
is probably valid with respect to the process or sequence of development. Kohlberg proposes that in every cultural setting all of the
children can be expected to display the same fixed order of stages
as they grow older. Cross-sectional data from five societies (Kohlberg 1969) as well as longitudinal data from Turkey (Turiel, Kohlberg, and Edwards n.d.) support this hypothesis. Nevertheless,
while some of the stages have definitely been recorded in the interviews of children from diverse cultures, not all of the stages have
been so found. Statements representative of the higher moral stages
seem to be absent from the interviews of children raised in semiliterate, relatively isolated peasant villages in Turkey (Turiel,
Kohlberg, and Edwards n.d.), British Honduras (Gorsuch and
Barnes 1973), and the Bahamas (White 1975). In contrast, higher
stage reasoning has been scored in the protocols of urban school
children from Turkey (Turiel, Kohlberg, and Edwards n.d.), Taiwan, Mexico, and the United States (Kohlberg 1969), as well as
children from England (Simpson and Graham n.d.). Hence, only
Kohlberg's lower moral stages have been proved to be universal to
the cultures thus far sampled (and these include no hunter-gatherer
groups). The higher stages appear to be culture-specific, just the
opposite of culturally universal. Therefore, while the sequence of
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stages in children's development may be invariant from culture to
culture, only the first several stages in the system likely constitute
universal modes of reasoning.
Kohlberg explains the lack of the higher stages in the peasant
samples through what he calls "a mild doctrine of social evolutionism, such as was elaborated in the classic work of Hobhouse" (Kohlberg 1971:178). Thus, Kohlberg reintroduces the evolutionary doctrine previously discounted. In Kohlberg's view, all environments
are not expected to promote the development of moral judgment
equally. Rather, for different cultural settings, there will be different terminal points of development. In other words, the typical or
modal child in some cultures will develop farther than the modal
child in other cultures because their social environments affect
their processes of growth somewhat differently. The critical variable that determines the terminal point for the children's development within a particular cultural setting is the "complexity" of its
social and political organization (Kohlberg 1971). The more complex the institutional arrangements of a particular society, the
more likely it is that higher stage subjects will be found within that
society.
The critical idea here is that the end point of the development
of moral judgment is related to a structural feature of the social environment, namely, the complexity of institutional arrangements.
Can this be true? If so, the evolutionary implications that Kohlberg
stresses might not be the finding of central importance. More significant, the moral development evidence suggestsone way in which
cross-cultural differnces in cognitive functioning might be related
to variation in the pattern of the everyday lives of human beings.
The sphere of everyday life of interest would include interpersonal
disagreements and conflicts of claims. The nature of such problems
might differ systematically among different types of societies, and
therefore individual modes of conceptualizing moral issues might
tend to vary also. Several anthropologists and psychologists (e.g.
Bruner, Oliver, and Greenfield 1966, Horton 1967, Gladwin 1970,
Cole et al. 1971) have recently debated whether scientific modes of
reasoning vary from society to society in accordance with differences in the kinds of cognitive tasks typically encountered by people in those societies. The cross-cultural research on moral judgment raises a parallel question and suggests that certain of the
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mental processes involved in moral judging might correspond to
the requirements of social life in different parts of the world.
This paper suggests reasons why the higher stages of moral judgment are not culturally universal. If certain moral decision modes
are found only in the protocols of subjects from the developed
countries or from urban areas in the developing countries, this suggests that such modes are relevant to problems salient in these
"complex" social contexts but subordinate in other types of cultural settings. To be specific, the evidence suggests that stages 1 to 3
are definitely present among adults whose frame of reference is a
traditional and isolated peasant village as well as among adults from
more modern settings. In contrast, the cross-culturalresearch with
adult subjects, including the findings reported below, indicates that
reasoning that is characteristic of stages 4, 5, and 6 is limited to
educated subjects whose frame of reference is a complex society
such as a modern national state. If so, a boundary exists between
stages 3 and 4. This boundary occurs, I would propose, because
stage 3 is appropriate to the problems of social control and conflict
resolution in a simple society, whereas stage 4 contains assumptions
more suitable for the model of a complex society.
Because stage 4 seems to be the first higher moral stage that is
definitely not culturally universal, this paper focuses on the differences between stages 3 and 4. Using interview data on subjects from
both modernized and more traditional contexts in Kenya, the paper
suggests how peoples' differing frames of reference are related to
differing basic moral concepts. For the more modernized adults in
this sample, the frame of reference is modern-day Kenya, the developing nation; for the more traditional adults, the frame of reference remains the local tribal community within Kenya. This
distinction is shown to be empirically and theoretically related to
use of stage 4 versus stage 3 moral reasoning.'
1. Abraham Edel (1968), a philosopher, has made a related suggestion that
stages 5 and 6 may be culturally specific to constitutional democracies of the
Western model. This hypothesis could be tested by interviewing adults from
societies that are as complex as the Western industrial nations but are guided
by different politicel and economic ideologies (e.g., the USSR or China) . Such
a study would show whether the most sophisticated moral reasoning in the
noncapitalist countries assumes the forms defined by Kohlberg as stages 5 and
6. In the absence of such evidence, this essay limits itself to the extended consideration of stages 3 and 4 and their relationships to social organization.
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METHOD
SAMPLES

Two samples are considered: first, a group of young men and
women studying at the University of Nairobi; and second, a group
of adults and secondary students from seven communities located
in different parts of Kenya.
The university sample consists of 52 students (35 male, 17 female)
whom I interviewed at the University of Nairobi. These students
constitute an extremely heterogeneous sample in terms of ethnic
group, age, family background, and major field of study at the university. The majority (35 subjects) were black Africans from all of
the major tribes represented at the University of Nairobi, while the
minority (17 subjects) were Asiatics of Indo-Pakistani descent. In
general, the university subjects were slightly older than most
United States college students since they ranged in age from 19 to
31, with a median of 22.2. They came from large families (median
number of siblings, 6.1) and the majority of their parents had had
little formal education (median number of years of education for
mothers, 4.0, for fathers, 6.0). Most of their fathers (29) were subsistence farmers or manual laborers; others (23) were white-collar
workers. In one important respect the subjects are outstanding
members of their age group in Kenya. All of them have proved extremely successful at academic work, since only a tiny minority of
students who enter secondary school are able to pass through the
stepwise sequence of qualifying examinations that admit students
to the university system. The university subjects were recruited in
classes and through personal contacts. Possible subjects were informed that the purpose of the study was to understand their ideas
of right and wrong by having them discuss some hypothetical moral
dilemmas. Each subject received seven shillings for the interview
(one U.S. dollar).
The second sample consists of 47 males and 14 females living in
seven communities in the Central and Western Provinces of Kenya.
These subjects belonged to five different ethnic groups-four African tribal groups (the Kikuyus, Merus, Kipsigis, and Luyias) and
one Asian, or Indo-Pakistani, religious sect (the Ismailis). This
sample is termed the community sample because of the method of
data collection. Seven University of Nairobi students (4 male, 3
female) served as the staff of interviewers. The students, upper level
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majors in the social sciences, had been trained in the technique of
moral judgment interviewing but were not taught Kohlberg's
theory of stages (in order that their interview translations and transcriptions would not be biased). During the December school
holidays, each of the student interviewers returned home and conducted interviews with subjects of his or her own ethnic group.
The interviewer selected as subjects secondary school students (also
home for vacation) and adults residing in his or her local area.2
Although the goal for each interviewer was ten subjects, in most
cases shortage of time prevented full completion of this plan. The
final community sample consisted of 25 secondary school students
and 36 adults.
The adult subjects were all community leaders, that is, men and
women who might be considered "moral leaders" in their locales.
Those chosen had reputations as responsible citizens-persons
noted for giving useful advice and counsel. Most of these subjects
were officers or members of local civic organizations and church
groups; a few were also holders of local political office. Because the
interviewers worked in a variety of communities (ranging from the
rather traditional rural location of Sigor in Western Province to
the modern capital city of Nairobi) the subjects whom interviewers
selected as community leaders varied from nonschooled peasant
farmers to college-educated school teachers. Approximately half of
the subjects were farmers or unskilled laborers while the rest held
white collar jobs (teaching, office work, business management).
Ages ranged from 23 to 75, with a median of 48. Their median years
of formal education were 8.5. Twenty-five of the community leaders
were male, 11 were female.
The secondary school subjects chosen from the same communities serve mainly as a kind of comparison group to the community
Ieaders. These 25 subjects simply offer a sampling of the moral
thought and values of the "new generation" in the communities.
They were students whose homes were near the interviewers; they
2. The seven communities in which students interviewed were: (1) Githiga
location, 25 miles from Nairobi (a community of Kikuyu speakers); (2) Meru
Mwimbi location, 40 miles from Meru (a community of Kimeru speakers);
(3) Sigor location, 50 miles from Kericho (a community of Kipsigis speakers);
(4) Idakho location, 12 miles from Kakamega, and (5) North Wanga location,
50 miles from Kisumu (both communities of Baluyia speakers); (6) Nairobi,
and (7) Kisumu (two cities in which Ismailis were interviewed).
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were not selected on the basis of personal characteristics. Some attended prestige national boarding schools for top students from all
over Kenya, while others attended schools in their local areas.They
came fronmall six of the grades (or "forms") of secondary school,
and they ranged in age from 17 to 27, with a median of 19.6. Because it was much easier for the interviewers to locate male than
female secondary school students, most of the subjects were male
(21 out of 25).
THE INTERVIEW

The moral judgment interview included four hypothetical moral
dilemmas and a standard set of probing questions.3 Three of the
dilemmas were standard Kohlberg stories especially adapted for the
Kenyan setting (dilemmas of Heinz and the Drug, Mercy Killing,
and the Father-Son Agreement), while the fourth dilemma was
constructed in Kenya. One of the dilemmas (the fourth) is presented in table 2 below.
TABLE 2
HYPOTHETICALMORALDILEMMA
Daniel and the School Fees
A man, Daniel, managed to complete his secondary school education (Form 4) on
the basis of school fees given him by his brother. Afterwards he married and took his
wife to live with his parents in the rural area, while he got a job in the city. Eight
years later, when his first son was ready to go to primary school, his mother and father
came to him and said, "Your brother who educated you has been in an accident and
cannot work, so you must now begin to pay for the education of your brother's child."
This child was the same age as his own son. The man, Daniel, did not have enough
money to pay school fees for both his own son and his brother's child. His wife said
he must put his own son first.
1. What should Daniel do in this situation? Should he put his son or his brother's
child first? Why?
2. What obligation does he have to his brother who educated him?
3. What does he owe his son?
4. Should he obey his parents in this case? Do you think a grown son has to obey
all of his parents' wishes? Why, or why not?
5. What should a grown son do for his parents?
6. Is it more important to maintain harmonious relations with his wife or with his
brother and parents? Why?
7. Would you condemn Daniel if he just moved his wife and children to the city
and did not pay for the education of his nephew? Why?
8. Would you yourself expect your eldest children to help their younger brothers
and sisters with school fees? Why, or why not?
3. Thirty-one of the university subjects, as well as the entire community
sample, were presented the full battery of stories 1 to 4. The remaining 21
university subjects received only two or three of the dilemmas. Statistical com-
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Interviews of subjects with some secondary level education were
conducted in English. Interviews of subjects with six or fewer years
of schooling were conducted in native languages and later translated into English by the university students who conducted the
interviews.
SCORING AND RELIABILITY

Interviews were taped and later transcribed. The global method
(Kohlberg 1972) was followed for scoring. Each subject's full interview protocol was considered as a whole and assigned the stage
code (stages 1 to 6) most representative of the overall level of the
subject's moral reasoning.4 Many subjects, however, could not be
classified at one single stage because in one or more of the dilemmas
they presented clear evidence of two adjacent stages, such as stages
2 and 3 (more than two adjacent stages were not seen in any subjects). These subjects were classified as intermediate and assigned
a "mixed" score; for example, a 2(3) score ("major" stage of 2,
"minor" stage of 3) indicated that the bulk of a subject's discussion
lay at stage 2, with some secondary amount at stage 3.
Forty interviews (20 university, 20 community) were independently scored a second time. The Spearmanrank-ordercorrelations
between the two scorers indicated satisfactoryreliability (r. = 0.85
for the university subsample; r8 = 0.83 for the community subsample). In addition, percentage agreement between the two judges
attained the levels of 95% and 90%0,respectively, for the two samples (here agreement, following Haan, Smith, and Black [1968], has
been defined as either agreement on the major stage designation or
simple reversal of the major and minor stage designations).
parison of the latter group with the other university subjects, however, suggests that the variable number of dilemmas did not introduce systematic bias
(either upward or downward) into the moral judgment coding.
4. To make these judgments, the Issue Scoring Manual (Kohlberg 1972) was
used. This manual gives detailed descriptions of stages 1 to 6 modes of reasoning with respect to ten fundamental moral "issues" (such as property rights
and punishment); these issues are defined or conceptualized in characteristically different ways at each moral judgment stage. Because all four moral dilemmas
were designed to elicit ideas about the fundamental "issues," statements made
by subjects could be compared with statements in the' scoring manual. The
scorer, reading a subject's interview, recognized stage-typical modes of thought
and judged into which of the six moral judgment stages a subject's interview
could best be placed. For example, the scorer classified as stage 1 a subject who
displayed virtually nothing but stage 1 arguments throughout his interview.
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RESULTS
Table 3 presents the distribution of the moral judgment scores
for the university and community subjects. Frequencies of subjects
receiving each of the different stage assignments are given. The subjects with "intermediate" or "mixed" scores are included in the
mixed categories (e.g., subjects who were intermediate between
stages 2 and 3 are included in the category Mixed 2-3).
Table 3 shows that stage 4 reasoning is much more evident among
the university subjects than the community leaders, although the
leaders are on the average much older than the university students
(and have therefore had more time to develop). Among the university students, 31%oof subjects show major or minor stage usage
of stage 4 reasoning. In contrast, among the community leaders,
only 11% of subjects display any stage 4 reasoning.
In contrast, stage 3 reasoning is as frequent among the community leaders as among the university students. The two groups are
quite similar with respect to stage 3 usage, and contrast with the
secondary subjects, who show much more stage 2 (and mixed stage
2) reasoning. This higher percentage of stage 2 in the secondary
sample is not unexpected given the young age of the sample. Thus,
the community leaders are differentiated from the secondary students with respect to stage 2 usage (a finding probably owing to
development with age) and are differentiated from the university
subjects with respect to stage 4 usage (a finding certainly not owing
to an age factor).
If age is not a relevant dimension with which to explain the stage
4 usage difference between the community leaders and university
students, the question arises as to what could explain it. The critical
variable certainly cannot be lack of concern with moral questions
by the community leaders since all of them were noted "moral
leaders" in their communities. There are at least two conspicuous
differences, however, between the university students on the one
hand and the community leaders on the other hand which might
play a role in the stage 3 versus 4 dimension. The university students have undergone much more formal education and are oriented much more thoroughly toward professional jobs in the modem sector of the Kenyan economy than are most of the community
leaders. That these might be critical variables receives strong support from the brief personal sketches presented below of the four
community leaders who do show stage 4 reasoning:

Sample
leaders
Secondary
students
students
University
Community

0

0

0

1
Stage

1
(4%)

0

0

1-2
Mixed
Frequencies
(and

9
(36)0

6
(17%)

2 2
Stage
(4%)

FREQUENCY

percentages)
of
13
(52%)

14
(39%)

21 2-3
(40%) Mixed DISTRIBUTION
subjects,
OF
by

TABLE
THE
3

2
(8%)

12
(33%)

13 3
sample,
MORAL
(25%) Stage

receiving
JUDGMENT
0

4
(11%)

0

0

11 3-4
(21%) Mixed SCORES
different
moral
3 4
Stage
(6%)
judgment

0

0

stage
2 4-5
(4%)
Mixed
scores

25
52
36
(100%) (100%) (100%) Total
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1. A Luyia man, aged 36, who was teaching primaryschool in a rural
area in the WesternProvince.He had attended 8 yearsof formal education (primaryschoolonly).
2. A Kimeruman, aged 27, who at the time of the study was on leave
from his job as bank officer.He had workedin severaldifferentprovinces of Kenyain the towns of Kisii, Mombasa,Naivasha,and Nairobi.
He had attended the renownedAlliance High School in Central Province for six yearsand then studied for one furtheryear in London.
3. An Ismaili woman,aged 27, who wasworkingas a charteredsecretary
for a firm in Nairobi. She had attended four yearsof secondaryschool
in Mombasa,Kenya,and then completedthe final two yearsin England.
She also had attendedfour yearsof secretarialcollege in England.
4. An Ismaili man, aged 26, who owned a large businessin the city of
Kisumuin WesternProvince.He had attendedfour yearsof secondary
school in Kisumu, then gone to Bath Technical Institute in England
for four years altogether, where he obtained a bachelor's degree in
business administration.

Notice that both men and women, and members of three of the
five ethnic groups, are included in this small group. Such diversity
suggests that neither sex nor ethnic group are the important variables underlying the stage 3-stage 4 distinction. Rather, the personal sketches suggest that either higher education, professional
occupational roles, or both, are more important. Such a suggestion
receives support from the pattern of scores for the full community
leaders group with respect to both education and occupation versus
moral stage score.
Table 4 presents the data for the full community leaders sample.
The table displays the frequency of the moral stage scores with respect to subjects'level of education and type of occupation. Subjects
were categorized as having "primary" level of education if they
had attended one to eight years of primary school, they were categorized at the "secondary"level if they had attended one or more
years of secondary school, and they were labeled "college" if they
had attended some type of postsecondary institution (e.g., business
college). The findings show that education and occupation relate
positively to the moral judgment scores. Stage 4 reasoning is linked
to college education and white collar occupation.
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TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTIONOF SUBJECrS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY LEADERSSAMPLE, BY MORAL
JUDGMENT SCOREVERSUSEDUCATIONAND OCCUPATION

Moral judgment
score

Nonschooled

Subject's educational background
Primary
Secondary

Stage 2
Mixed 2-3
Stage 3
Mixed 3-4

3
5
3
0

Moral judgment
score

Subject's occupational type
Peasant farmer or
White collar
manual laborer
worker

Stage 2
Mixed 2-3
Stage 3
Mixed 3-4

3
6

College

6
10
4
0

0
2

2

5

1

0

0
1
2
3

0
4
8
4

Of course, education and occupation should not be thought of
as independent factors-they are highly intercorrelated in the
sample. Some of the community leaders can be considered highly
"modemnized"-they attended Western-style schools for many years
and they now occupy white collar jobs in the modem sector of the
Kenyan economy. They either live in cities or serve as teachers for
schools in the rural area. Others of the community leaders are much
more "traditional"-they did not receive much, if -any, Westernstyle schooling and they live in the rural areas where they either
own farms or do manual work. This latter group of individuals,
however, should not be thought of as people at the bottom of the
Kenyan social hierarchy. Within their own village communities
they are quite eminent; they may be wealthy by local standardsand
they certainly wield power and influence. Within their own frame
of reference (what might be called the "traditional" sector-of the
Kenyan economy), they are "big men" and highly respected women.
DISCUSSION
The empirical findings suggest that stage 3 may be the highest of
Kohlberg's moral judgment stages commonly found among "moral
leaders" in Kenya whose frame of reference is the semitraditional,
rural village community. Stage 3 may represent the mature moral
perspective in this type of cultural setting, the face-to-facesociety.
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In contrast, stage 4 modes are more frequently expressed by the new
elite (the university students) whose education and goals make their
frame of reference modern-day Kenya, the developing nation.
The trend of these findings is supported by three other crosscultural studies of adult groups. Research in Turkey (Turiel,
Kohlberg, and Edwards n.d.), Thailand (Batt 1974), and India
(Parikh 1975) indicates that under the most recent rules of scoring,
stage 3 is the highest of Kohlberg's stages found among traditionally
oriented adults from peasant societies. All three studies show substantial amounts of stage 4 modes of reasoning among the universityeducated portions of their samples.
An explanation for all of these findings lies in the character of
the stage 3 and 4 modes of reasoning. Built into the operational
definitions of stages 3 and 4 are different assumptions about the
nature of society. Stage 3 assumptions, I argue, correspond to the
model of the face-to-face community, while those of stage 4 correspond to a state, or national, model. This can be demonstrated
through an analysis that considers, on the one hand, some basic
aspects of life in the two types of societies, and on the other hand,
the ways in which stages 3 and 4 are differentiated from each other
with respect to five basic moral "issues"or categories: (1) authority,
(2) punishment, (3) rules and law, (4) guilt and blame, and (5) individual liberty. Other issues besides these five might have been
included; but this sample serves to show how modes of moral judgment may reflect the conditions of life in different kinds of societies.
Excerpts from the Issue Scoring Manual (Kohlberg 1972) illustrate
how the different moral issues are defined at stages 3 and 4.
A face-to-face society, such as a tribal group, and a state or national system differ in their institutions and processesof social control. E. Adamson Hoebel (1954) discusses this problem with reference to primitive versus civilized law. Hoebel states, "the more
civilized man becomes, the greater is man's need for law, and the
more law he creates" (1954:293). Simply to perform the functions
of maintaining public order and resolving civil disputes, a state
system requires more elaborate and formal legal institutions than
does a tribal society.
At the level of tribal society, most disputes or "trouble cases"can
be settled with justice and dispatch by conference between the
disputants, aided by respected clan or tribal elders who mediate the
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case (Gluckman 1955, Bohannan 1957, Gulliver 1963). The mediators judge according to cultural norms that represent a flexible set
of guidelines rather than a formal body of laws. The mediators' job
involves more than simply weighing the evidence and deciding in
favor of one side of the dispute or the other. The mediators must
give justice where justice is due and at the same time create a workable compromise that will be tolerated by both parties. They must
take care to reestablish harmony in the community as well as uphold the moral norms (Snell 1954, Saltman 1971) since no central
authority exists to enforce the mediators' decision.
A national state requires more formal and elaborate legal mechanisms because of those social control problems inherent in urbanization and the expansion of the social unit to a much larger scale
(Hoebel 1954:327-329). In the first place, urbanization breaks
down the organization based upon kinship and personal ties which
is characteristic of tribal society. It thereby frees the individual
from the control of his kinsmen and sets him among large groups
of strangers. New mechanisms must be devised to take over the
work of the kinship network. Allegiance to the state and the law
must be forged out of loyalty and obedience to the clan. In the
second place, when urban centers arise in multicultural societies,
they function to bring together massesof people who have different
backgrounds and also different values, goals, and life-styles. Value
diversity proliferates in cities and brings with it a whole new series
of social problems. Legal and moral conceptions must be developed
to guide individuals in this complex situation. Both of these factors
-the loss by the individual of the face-to-facecommunity, and the
heterogeneity of values encountered in the city-can be linked to
the differences between stages 3 and 4 types of moral judgment.
Urbanization loosens the ties between the individual and his
kinship group and shifts the responsibility for controlling him from
the face-to-facecommunity to the "state."The state is an impersonal and anonymous system as far as individuals are concerned. The
authority of state officials over the individual rarely has any elements of a personal relationship, as it always does in a face-to-face
community, where the seniority and the leadership qualities of
authorities naturally inspire respect. The impersonality of the state,
however, requires that other reasons be developed for obeying govemnmentofficials. One possible reason is respect for the authority's
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office and for the system that underlies that office. Here is the distinction between the stage 3 and stage 4 ideas of respect for authority..
Stage 3. Respectfor authoritybasedon affectionor belief in his personal
virtue, his concernfor subordinates,and what he has done in the past
for them.
Stage 4. An internal attitude of respectfor authorityis expectedbased

on the authorityrepresentingsociety and order.
(Kohlberg1972:Tables Set A)
When the responsibility for controlling the individual shifts
from the face-to-facecommunity to the state, the sanctioning agents
for wrongdoing change from being the people in the community to
institutionalized legal authorities. This transition can be linked
to differences between stages 3 and 4 concepts of punishment and
of rules and laws. In the tribal setting, the problems created by
interpersonal disputes bring local groups into conflict and threaten
to tear the community apart (Hoebel 1954). Therefore, the task of
the mediators of a trouble-case is to work out a solution that will
restore good relations between the plaintiff and his supporters and
the defendant and his supporters. For example, in traditional customary Kipsigis law, a homicide case was settled when the clan of
the murderers paid blood money to the clan of the victim. If the
killer had murdered several times and was considered incorrigible
by his clan, he would be abandoned to the vengeance of the victim's
relatives. For the national state system, the responsibility for punishing wrongdoers is vested not in the local community but in the
state itself. Permanent institutions, in the form of police, courts,
and prisons, exist to settle both the civil and criminal cases in the
society. Hence it is a punishable offense for private groups to "take
the law into their own hands" and seek their own vengeance. This
distinction between tribal and state processesof conflict resolution
is reflected in the stage 3 versus 4 concept of punishment:
Stage 3. The functionof punishmentis to reformthe culprit,to strength-

en his desire to be good, and to restorehis relations to the victim by
repaymentand forgiveness.
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Stage 4. Punishment expresses the horror at the crime felt by law-

abiding men, and is designed to teach that horror (or remorse)to the
criminal.Crimeis an offenseagainstsociety,punishmentis payingone's
debt to society.
(Kohlberg1972:Issue G)
Further, in the tribal setting, the rules that the mediators use to
resolve disputes are flexible guidelines or norms that define duty
and obligation for the social roles of the group. In contrast, for the
state there is a fixed uniform code of law to give order across all of
the disparate local regions within the society. This contrast is seen
in the stage 3 versus stage 4 concept of rules and laws.
Stage 3. Rules and laws are guides . . . to social or "goodend seeking."
They are guides to "being good."
Stage 4. Rules and laws are a fixed systemof generalrules to be followed

always,a systemdesigned to prevent social disorder and chaos. Rules
and laws define "rightand wrong"categorically.
(Kohlberg1972:Tables Set A)
A second feature of the state as opposed to the tribal society is
the extreme heterogeneity of values of its citizens. As is clearly seen
in Kenya today, urbanization throws together massesof people from
different cultural backgrounds who disagree with each other on
major as well as minor issues of morality. In a face-to-facecommunity, where people tend to share many basic standards, it is reasonable to view wrongdoing as displeasing "the community." The
moral individual does not want to offend the people among whom
he has always lived and whose opinion he esteems. In the urban
setting, however, standards are not even approximately shared and
doing wrong cannot simply be a matter of offending "people's
ideas." Instead, the moral individual might orient toward the
imagined disapproval of people whose values he does accept. This
audience could be somewhat abstract in constituency, as when a
scientist thinks about "the community of science." Such a contrast
is embodied in the distinction between the stage 3 and 4 conceptions of guilt and blame.
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Stage 3. Orientedto disapprovalby others.This disapprovalshadesover
into guilt in the sense that . . . [imagined disapproval may be] . . .

motivating,even if it is [actually]possible to avoid detection. Concern
about disapprovalfrom authority or victim as reason for moral conformity. . .depends for its potencyupon a personalrelationshipto the
person disapproving.
Stage 4. A concernfor loss of respectby one's peers or by disinterested

membersof the community;[this concern]is more or less identical with
a loss of self-respect.Concernabout other'srespectis based on the fact
that standards are shared with others. .. . Respect is different from ap-

provalin being an impersonaljudgmentaccordingto standardsshared
by the self. The validity of the respect of others rests upon its being
based on standardssharedor acceptedby the self, and used by the self
in judging others.
(Kohlberg1972: Issue B)
The extreme heterogeneity of values in the urban setting can be
traced to other ideas of morality besides guilt and blame. It also has
links to ideas about rights of the individual. In the context of pervasive value divergence, individuals must be provided some reasonable amount of freedom from interference by others who dislike their religion, political views, life-styles, and so on. Society
must define what is such a reasonable amount of freedom and then
protect it through law. The domain of protected freedom can be
called the "rights of the individual." The issue of protecting personal liberty arises in a different way in a small community where
people share certain general standardsabout good and bad conduct.
For example, in a tribal society, people often disagree with each
other but this occurs against the background of a certain minimal
level of agreement about moral standards. Values about personal
liberty, however, may still be important for a tribal society. People
may be expected to grant each other enough autonomy to live their
lives in peace. This value would be expressed in terms of refraining
from malicious gossip and minding one's own business, not respecting people's "natural or human rights." Of course, personal liberty
would not be considered to be unlimited. Sometimes it would be
considered proper to intrude upon other's privacy-for example,
when someone is secretly engaged in immoral conduct. The distinction just elaborated between individual rights in the national
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context versus reasonable liberty in the tribal setting, appears in
the stage 3 versus 4 concept of liberty and civil rights.
Stage 3. Issues of rights and liberty are subordinatedto "nice"or hu-

mane treatment of one person by another. One can infringe on the
liberties of others for a prosocialpurpose,and one's own liberties are
restrictedby the requirementthat one be prosocial.
Stage 4. Liberties are one of a class of rights deriving from society or
guaranteedby society. These rights are "absolute"with regard to the
whim or demandsof anotherindividual,but they are definedby society
and may be restrictedfor the sakeof social orderand welfare.
(Kohlberg1972: Tables Set A)
CONCLUSION
The discussion has suggested why different modes of moral
decision-making are appropriate for the tribal versus national
frames of reference. In terms of Kohlberg's stage system of moral
judgment, stage 3 is the type of thinking most suitable for a faceto-face community, while stage 4 is more suitable for the national
state. Although stage 4 is considered more complex and differentiated than stage 3, it is not as a function of its greater cognitive difficulty that it is more likely to be absent among peasant villagers
than urban dwellers. Rather, stage 4 incorporates notions of authority, punishment, rules and law, guilt and blame, and individual
liberty which are directly relevant to conditions of life in the urban
context. An urban existence-with its anonymity, impersonality,
and heterogeneity-presents moral problems that are not met in
the face-to-facecommunity. New mechanisms of social control are
developed in the transition from tribal to civilized society, and new
modes of moral judging may evolve as a result of the same social
forces. Modes of moral judgment should be viewed as adaptive
structures developed by people to accomplish important cognitive
tasksat hand. They should not be seen as "achievements"for which
"higher" is necessarily better. Insofar as we come to understand
what are the cognitive requirements of life in different kinds of
social environments, we will learn along what dimensions the processes of thought may differ from culture to culture, or even from
subculture to subculture within a pluralistic society such as our
own.

5266

ETHOS

REFERENCES
1968. Conduct and Conscience: The Socialization
of Internalized Control over Behavior. Academic Press.
BALDWIN, JAMES MARK. 1902. Social and Ethical Interpretations in
Mental Development. The Macmillan Company.
BATr, H. WILLIAM .1974. Guilt, Shame, and the Bureaucratic Model:
With Specific Reference to Thai Public Administration. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, State University of New
.York, Albany.
BOHANNAN, PAUL. 1957. Justice and Judgment among the Tiv. Oxford
University Press.
ARONFREED, JUSTIN.

BRUNER, JEROME S., ROSE R. OLVER, and

1966.

PATRICIA M. GREENFIELD.

Studies in Cognitive Growth. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
COLE,

MICHAEL,

JOHN

GAY,

JOSEPH A.

GLICK,

and

DONALD

SHARP.

W.

1971. The Cultural Context of Learning and Thinking. Basic Books,
Inc.
JOHN, and

DEWEY,

JAMES

H.

TUFTS.

1908. Ethics. Henry Holt and Com-

pany.
1968. Scientific Research and Moral Judgment. Paper
delivered at the Conference on the Acquisition and Development of
Values, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.
GLADWIN, THOMAS. 1970. East is a Big Bird. Harvard University Press.
GLUCKMAN, MAX. 1955. The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence. Yale University Press.
L., and M. LOUISEBARNES. 1973. Stages of Ethical
GoRsuCH, RICHARD
Reasoning and Moral Norms of Carib Youths, Journal of CrossCultural Psychology 4:283-301.
GULLIVER, PHILIP H. 1963. Social Control in an African Society. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
HAAN, N., M. B. SMITH,and J. BLOCK. 1968. The Moral Reasoning of
Young Adults: Political-Social Behavior, Family Background, and
Personality Correlation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
10:183-201.
HOBHOUSE, L. T. 1906. Morals in Evolution: A Study in Comparative

EDEL, ABRAHAM.

Ethics. Chapman and Hall, Ltd.
HOEBEL,
versity

E. ADAMSON. 1954. The Law of Primitive Man.

Harvard

Uni-

Press.

HORTON, ROBIN.

1967. African

Traditional

Thought

and Western

Sci-

ence. Africa (pt. 1) 37:50-71; (pt. 2) 37:155-187.
KANT,

IMMANUEL.

T. and T. Clark.

1887. The Philosophy of Law,

trans. by

W.

Hastie.

SOCIETALCOMPLEXITY
AND MORAI.DEVELOPMENTU

527

KOHLBERG,LAWRENCE.1963. Moral Development and Identification,

Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (H. W.
Stevenson, ed.), pp. 277-332. Part I, Child Psychology. University of
Chicago Press.
1969. Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, Handbook of Socialization (D. Goslin, ed.),
pp. 347-480. Rand McNally.
. 1971. From Is to Ought, Cognitive Development and Epistemology (T. Mischel, ed.), pp. 151-235. Academic Press.
. 1972. Issue Scoring Manual. Moral Education Research Foundation.
KOHLBERG,LAWRENCE,KELSEYKAUFFMAN,PETERSCHARF,and JOSEPH
HICKEY. 1974. The Just Community Approach to Corrections: A

Manual, Part II. Moral Education Research Foundation.
MEAD, GEORGEHERBERT.1934. Mind, Self, and Society. University of

Chicago Press.
PARIKH,BINDU. 1975. Moral Judgment and Development and Its Re-

lation to Family Environmental Factors in Indian and American Urban Upper-Middle Class Families. Ed.D. dissertation, Department of
Special Education, Boston University.
PIAGET,JEAN. 1932. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
SALTMAN,MICHAEL.1971. A Restatement of Kipsigis Customary Law.
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Brandeis University.
SIMPSON,ANNA LOUISE,and DOUGLASGRAHAM.n.d. The Development
of Moral Judgment, Emotion, and Behavior in British Adolescents,
Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach (L. Kohlberg,
ed.), Holt. Rinehart and Winston (forthcoming).
SNELL, G. S. 1954. Nandi Customary Law. Macmillan and Company,
Ltd.
SPENCER,HERBERT.1899. The Principles of Ethics, Volume I. D. Appleton and Company.
TURIEL, ELLIOT,LAWRENCEKOHLBERG,and CAROLYNP. EDWARDS.n.d.
A Cross-Cultural Study of Moral Development in Turkey and the
United States, The Structure of Change in Cognitive and Social Development (E. Turiel and J. Langer, eds.) (forthcoming).
WHITE, CHARLESB. 1975. Moral Development in Bahamian School
Children: A Cross-Cultural Examination of Kohlberg's Stages of
Moral Reasoning. Developmental Psychology 11:535-536.

